Modern French Philosophy: a Study of the Development Since Comte — Reading Notes

HAPTER I. ANTECEDENTS CHAPTER II. MAIN CURRENTS SINCE 1851 CHAPTER III. SCIENCE CHAPTER IV. FREEDOM CHAPTER V. PROGRESS CHAPTER VI. ETHICS CHAPTER VII. RELIGION CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY COMPARATIVE TABLE INDEX

“Mais il n’y a pas que cette France, que cette France glorieuse, que cette France révolutionnaire, cette France émancipatrice et initiatrice du genre humain, que cette France d’une activité merveilleuse et comme on l’a dit, cette France nourrie des idées générales du monde, il y a une autre France que je n’aime pas moins, une autre France qui m’est encore plus chère, c’est la France misérable, c’est la France vaincue et humiliée, c’est la France qui est accablée, c’est la France qui traîne son boulet depuis quatorze siècles, la France qui crie, suppliante vers la justice et vers la liberté, la France que les despotes poussent constamment sur les champs de bataille, sous prétexte de liberté, pour lui faire verser son sang par toutes les artères et par toutes les veines, oh! cette France-là, je l’aime.”—GAMBETTA, _Discours_, 29 _September_, 1872.

“Les jeunes gens de tous les pays du monde qui sont venus dans les campagnes de France combattre pour la civilisation et le droit seront sans doute plus disposés à y revenir, apres la guerre chercher la nourriture intellectuelle. Il importe qu’ils soient assurés de l’y trouver, saine, abondante et forte.”—M. D. PARODI, _Inspecteur de l’Académie de Paris, 1919_.

_Je serais heureux que le public anglais sût le bien que je pense du livre de M. Gunn, sur la philosophie francaise depuis 1851. Le sujet choisi est neuf, car il n’existe pas, à ma connaissance, d’ouvrage relatif à toute cette période de la philosophie française. Le beau livre que M. Parodi vient de publier en français traite surtout des vingt dernières années de notre activité philosophique. M. Gunn, remontant jusqu’à Auguste Comte, a eu raison de placer ainsi devant nous toute le seconde moitié du siècle passé. Cette période de cinquante ans qui a précédée notre vingtième siècle est d’une importance capitale. Elle constitue réellement notre dix-neuvième siècle philosophique, car l’oeuvre même de Maine de Biran, qui est antérieure, n’a été bien connue et étudiée qu’à ce moment, et la plupart de nos idées philosophiques actuelles ont été élaborées pendant ces cinquante ans._

_Le sujet est d’ailleurs d’une complication extrême, en raison du nombre et de la variété des doctrines, en raison surtout de la diversité des questions entre lesquelles se sont partagés tant de penseurs. Dr. Gunn a su ramener toutes ces questions à un petit nombre de problèmes essentiels : la science, la liberté, le progrès, la morale, la religion. Cette division me paraît heureuse. Elle répond bien, ce me semble, aux principales préoccupations de la philosophie francaise. Elle a permis à l’auteur d’être complet, tout en restant simple, clair, et facile à suivre._

_Elle présente, il est vrai, un inconvénient, en ce qu’elle morcelle la doctrine d’un auteur en fragments dont chacun, pris à part, perd un peu de sa vitalite et de son individualité. Elle risque ainsi de présenter comme trop semblable à d’autres la solution que tel philosophe a donnée de tel problème, solution qui, replacée dans l’ensemble de la doctrine, apparaîtrait comme propre à ce penseur, originale et plus forte. Mais cet inconvénient était inévitable et l’envers de l’avantage que je signalais plus haut, celui de l’ordre, de la continuité et de la clarté._

_Le travail du Dr. Gunn m’apparaît comme tout à fait distingué. Il témoigne d’une information singulièrement étendue, précise et sûre. C’est l’oeuvre d’un esprit d’une extrême souplesse, capable de s’assimiler vite et bien la pensée des philosophes, de classer les idées dans leur ordre d’importance, de les exposer méthodiquement et les apprécier à leur juste valeur._

[These pages are a revised extract from the more formal _Rapport_ which was presented by M. Bergson to the University of Liverpool].

This work is the fruit of much reading and research done in Paris at the Sorbonne and Bibliothèque nationale. It is, substantially, a revised form of the thesis presented by the writer to the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy, obtained in 1921. The author is indebted, therefore, to the University for permission to publish. More especially must he record his deep gratitude to the French thinkers who gave both stimulus and encouragement to him during his sojourn in Paris. Foremost among these is M. Henri Bergson, upon whose _rapport_ the Doctorate was conferred, and who has expressed his appreciation of the work by contributing a Foreword for publication.

Mention must also be made of the encouragement given by the late M. Emile Boutroux and by the eminent editor of the well-known _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_, M. Xavier Léon, a leading spirit in the _Société de Philosophie_, whose meetings the writer was privileged to attend by invitation. Then MM. Brunschvicg, Levy-Bruhl, Lalande, Rey and Lenoir, from time to time discussed the work with him and he must record his appreciation of their kindness.

To Professor Mair of Liverpool is due the initial suggestion, and it has been felt a fitting tribute to his supervision, criticism, encouragement and sympathy that this book should be respectfully dedicated to him by one of his grateful pupils. In the labour of dealing with the proofs, the writer has to acknowledge the co-operation of Miss M. Linn and Mr. J. E. Turner, M.A.

The method adopted in this history has been deliberately chosen for its usefulness in emphasising the development of ideas. A purely chronological method has not been followed. The biographical system has likewise been rejected. The history of the development of thought centres round problems, and it progresses in relation to these problems. The particular manner in which the main problems presented themselves to the French thinkers of the second half of the nineteenth century was largely determined by the events and ideas which marked the period from 1789 to 1851. For this reason a chapter has been devoted to Antecedents. Between the Revolution and the _coup d’état_ of Napoleon III., four distinct lines of thought are discernible. Then the main currents from the year 1851 down to 1921 are described, with special reference to the development of the main problems. The reconciliation of _science_ and _conscience_ proved to be the main general problem, which became more definitely that of Freedom. This in itself is intimately bound up with the doctrines of progress, of history, of ethics and religion. These topics are discussed in a manner which shows their bearing upon each other. The conclusion aims at displaying the characteristics of French thought which reveal themselves in the study of these great problems. Its vitality, concreteness, clearness, brilliance and precision are noted and a comparison made between French thought and German philosophy.

From a general philosophical standpoint few periods could be so fascinating. Few, if any, could show such a complete revolution of thought as that witnessed since the year 1851. To bring this out clearly is the main object of the present book. It is intended to serve a double purpose. Primarily, it aims at being a contribution to the history of thought which will provide a definite knowledge of the best that has been said and thought among philosophers in France during the last seventy years. Further, it is itself an appeal for serious attention to be given to French philosophy. This is a field which has been comparatively neglected by English students, so far as the nineteenth century is concerned, and this is especially true of our period, which is roughly that from Comte to Boutroux (who passed away last month) and Bergson (who has this year resigned his professorship). It is the earnest desire of the writer to draw both philosophical students and lovers of France and its literature to a closer study and appreciation of modern French philosophy. Emotion and sentiment are inadequate bases for an _entente_ which is to be really _cordiale_ between any two peoples. An understanding of their deepest thoughts is also necessary and desirable. Such an understanding is, after all, but a step towards that iternationalisation of thought, that common fund of human culture and knowledge, which sets itself as an ideal before the nations of the world. _La philosophie n’a pas de patrie! Les idées sont actuellement les forces internationales._

THE UNIVERSITY, LIVERPOOL, _December_, 1921

CHAPTER I (INTRODUCTORY) ANTECEDENTS

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE MAIN CURRENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 1789 UP TO 1851.

After the Revolution—The Traditionalists: Chateaubuand, De Bonald, De Maistre, Lamennais, Lacordaire

2. The Eclectics: Cousin, Jouffroy.

3. The Socialists: Saint-Simon, Fourier and Cabal, Proudhon and Blanc.

4.Positivism: Auguste Comte.

CHAPTER I ANTECEDENTS

This work deals with the great French thinkers since the time of Auguste Comte, and treats, under various aspects, the development of thought in relation to the main problems which confronted these men. In the commencement of such an undertaking we are obliged to acknowledge the continuity of human thought, to recognise that it tends to approximate to an organic whole, and that, consequently, methods resembling those of surgical amputation are to be avoided. We cannot absolutely isolate one period of thought. For this reason a brief survey of the earlier years is necessary in order to orient the approach to the period specially placed in the limelight, namely 1851-1921.

In the world of speculative thought and in the realm of practical politics we find reflected, at the opening of the century, the work of the French Revolutionaries on the one hand, and that of Immanuel Kant on the other. Coupled with these great factors was the pervading influence of the Encyclopædists and of the thinkers of the Enlightenment. These two groups of influences, the one sudden and in the nature of a shock to political and metaphysical thought, the other quieter but no less effective, combined to produce a feeling of instability and of dissatisfaction at the close of the eighteenth century. A sense of change, indeed of resurrection, filled the minds and hearts of those who saw the opening of the nineteenth century. The old aristocracy and the monarchy in France had gone, and in philosophy the old metaphysic had received a blow at the hands of the author of the Three Critiques.

No better expression was given to the psychological state of France at this time than that of Alfred de Musset in his _Confession d’un Enfant du Siècle_. _Toute la maladie du siècle présent_ (he wrote) _vient de deux causes; le peuple qui a passé par ’93 et par 1814 porte au cœur deux blessures. Tout ce qui était n’est plus; tout ce qui sera n’est pas encore. Ne cherchez ailleurs le secret de nos maux._[1] De Musset was right, the whole course of the century was marked by conflict between two forces—on the one hand a tendency to reaction and conservatism, on the other an impulse to radicalism and revolution.

[1] The extract is taken from _Première partie_, ch. 2. The book was published in 1836. Somewhat similar sentiments are uttered with reference to this time by Michelet. (See his _Histoire du XIXe Siècle_, vol. i., p. 9).

It is true that one group of thinkers endeavoured, by a perfectly natural reaction, to recall their fellow-countrymen, at this time of unrest, back to the doctrines and traditions of the past, and tried to find in the faith of the Christian Church and the practice of the Catholic religion a rallying-point. The monarchy and the Church were eulogised by Chateaubriand, while on the more philosophical side efforts on behalf of traditionalism were made very nobly by De Bonald and Joseph de Maistre. While they represented the old aristocracy and recalled the theocracy and ecclesiasticism of the past by advocating reaction and Ultramontanism, Lamennais attempted to adapt Catholicism to the new conditions, only to find, as did Renan later, that “one cannot argue with a bar of iron.” Not the brilliant appeals of a Lacordaire, who thundered from Notre Dame, nor the modernism of a Lamennais, nor the efforts in religious philosophy made by De Maistre, were, however, sufficient to meet the needs of the time.

The old traditions and the old dogmas did not offer the salvation they professed to do. Consequently various groups of thinkers worked out solutions satisfactory to themselves and which they offered to others. We can distinguish clearly four main currents, the method of introspection and investigation of the inner life of the soul, the adoption of a spiritualist philosophy upon an eclectic basis, the search for a new society after the manner of the socialists and, lastly, a positive philosophy and religion of humanity. These four currents form the historical antecedents of our period and to a brief survey of them we now turn.

To find the origin of many of the tendencies which appear prominently in the thought of the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly those displayed by the new spiritualistic philosophy (which marked the last thirty years of the century), we must go back to the period of the Revolution, to Maine de Biran (1766-1824)—a unique and original thinker who laid the foundations of modern French psychology and who was, we may note in passing, a contemporary of Chateaubriand. A certain tone of romanticism marks the work of both the literary man and the philosopher. Maine de Biran was not a thinker who reflected upon his own experiences in retreat from the world. Born a Count, a Lifeguardsman to Louis XVI. at the Revolution, and faithful to the old aristocracy, he was appointed, at the Restoration, to an important administrative position, and later became a deputy and a member of the State Council. His writings were much greater in extent than is generally thought, but only one important work appeared in publication during his lifetime. This was his treatise, or _mémoire_, entitled _Habitude_, which appeared in 1803. This work well illustrates Maine de Biran’s historical position in the development of French philosophy. It came at a tome when attention and interest, so far as philosophical problems were concerned, centred round two “foci.” These respective centres are indicated by Destutt de Tracy,[2] the disciple of Condillac on the one hand, and by Cabanis[3] on the other. Both were “ideologues” and were ridiculed by Napoleon who endeavoured to lay much blame upon the philosophers. We must notice, however, this difference. While the school of Condillac,[4] influenced by Locke, endeavoured to work out a psychology in terms of abstractions, Cabanis, anxious to be more concrete, attempted to interpret the life of the mind by reference to physical and physiological phenomena.

[2] Destutt de Tracy, 1754-1836. His _Elements of Ideology_ appeared in 1801. He succeeded Cabanis in the Académie in 1808, and in a complimentary _Discours_ pronounced upon his predecessor claimed that Cabanis had introduced medicine into philosophy and philosophy into medicine. This remark might well have been applied later to Claude Bernard.

[3] Cabanis, 1757-1808, _Rapports du Physique et du Morale de l’Homme_, 1802. He was a friend of De Biran, as also was Ampère, the celebrated physicist and a man of considerable philosophical power. A group used to meet _chez Cabanis_ at Auteuil, comprising De Biran, Cabanis, Ampère, Royard-Collard, Guizot, and Cousin.

[4] Condillac belongs to the eighteenth century. He died in 1780. His _Traité des Sensations_ is dated 1754.

It is the special merit of De Biran that he endeavoured, and that successfully, to establish both the concreteness and the essential spirituality of the inner life. The attitude and method which he adopted became a force in freeing psychology, and indeed philosophy in general, from mere play with abstractions. His doctrines proved valuable, too, in establishing the reality and irreducibility of the mental or spiritual nature of man.

Maine de Biran took as his starting-point a psychological fact, the reality of conscious effort. The self is active rather than speculative; the self is action or effort—that is to say, the self is, fundamentally and primarily, will. For the Cartesian formula _Cogito, ergo sum,_ De Biran proposed to substitute that of _Volo, ergo sum_. He went on to maintain that we have an internal and immediate perception of this effort of will through which we realise, at one and the same time, our self in its fullest activity and the resistance to its operations. In such effort we realise ourselves as free causes and, in spite of the doctrine of physical determinism, we realise in ourselves the self as a cause of its own volitions. The greater the resistance or the greater the effort, the more do we realise ourselves as being free and not the absolute victims of habit. Of this freedom we have an immediate consciousness, it is _une donnée immédiate de la conscience._

This freedom is not always realised, for over against the tendency to action we must set the counter-tendency to passivity. Between these two exists, in varying degrees of approach to the two extremes, _habitude_. Our inner life is seen by the psychologist as a field of conflict between the sensitive and the reflective side of our nature. It is this which gives to the life of this _homo duplex_ all the elements of struggle and tragedy. In the desires and the passions, says Maine de Biran, the true self is not seen. The true self appears in memory, reasoning and, above all, in will.

Such, in brief, is the outline of De Biran’s psychology. To his two stages, _vie sensitive_ and _vie active_ (_ou réflexive_), he added a third, _la vie divine_. In his religious psychology he upheld the great Christian doctrines of divine love and grace as against the less human attitude of the Stoics. He still insists upon the power of will and action and is an enemy of the religious vice of quietism. In his closing years De Biran penned his ideas upon our realisation of the divine love by intuition. His intense interest in the inner life of the spirit gives De Biran’s _Journal Intime_ a rank among the illuminating writings upon religious psychology.

Maine de Biran was nothing if not a psychologist. The most absurd statement ever made about him was that he was “the French Kant.” This is very misleading, for De Biran’s genius showed itself in his psychological power and not in critical metaphysics. The importance of his work and his tremendous influence upon our period, especially upon the new spiritualism, will be apparent. Indeed he himself foresaw the great possibilities which lay open to philosophy along the lines he laid down. “_Qui sait,_” he remarked,[5] “_tout ce que peut la réflection concentrée et s’il n’y a pas un nouveau monde intérieur qui pourra être découvert un jour par quelque ‘Colomb métaphysicien.’_” With Maine de Biran began the movement in French philosophy which worked through the writings of Ravaisson, Lachelier, Guyau, Boutroux and particularly Bergson. A careful examination of the philosophy of this last thinker shows how great is his debt to Maine de Biran, whose inspiration he warmly acknowledges.

But it is only comparatively recently that Maine de Biran has come to his own and that his real power and influence have been recognised. There are two reasons for this, firstly the lack of publication of his writings, and secondly his being known for long only through the work of Cousin and the Eclectics, who were imperfectly acquainted with his work. Upon this school of thought he had some little influence which was immediate and personal, but Cousin, although he edited some of his unpublished work, failed to appreciate its originality and value.

So for a time De Biran’s influence waned when that of Cousin himself faded. Maine de Biran stands quite in a different category from the Eclectics, as a unique figure at a transition period, the herald of the best that was to be in the thought of the century. Cousin and the Eclectic school, however, gained the official favour, and eclecticism was for many years the “official philosophy.”